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One of the most influential ideas in the field of law and
economics has been that the allocation of property rights may
have little effect on the ultimate use of property.' Indeed, Ronald
Coase was awarded the 1991 Nobel Prize in economics partially
in recognition of his contribution to this line of thought. A rich
body of literature now claims that when certain highly stylized
conditions are met, the assignment of property rights will not
affect the ultimate allocation of goods anong rational actors.2
Under such conditions, the literature argues, private bargaining,
not judicial or regulatory intervention, will lead to the most
efficient use of economic resources.3
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1 This idea, which has come to be known as the "Coase Theorem," first appeared in
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
2 Particularly influential examples include Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law § 1.1 at 8, § 3.6 at 49-52 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992), and William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 29-53 (Harvard, 1987). See also
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1094-96 (1972) (noting that economic
efficiency does not mean, however, that the same ultimate allocation of goods will result
regardless of the initial allocation of property rights, due to wealth effects and other dis-
tortions). For a recent review of the literature and application of economic principles in an
environmental law context, see Note, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for
Damage to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 Colum L Rev 430 (1991).
' Most of the theoretical and empirical law-and-economics literature related to the
Coase Theorem supports a laissez-faire judicial system. The conditions necessary for an
efficient laissez-faire system include: (a) costless negotiation, (b) well-specified property
rights, and (c) redistribution that does not affect marginal values. See P.R.G. Layard and
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But despite the influence of conventional law and economics
on American jurisprudence, the instances in which it properly
applies may be more limited than often is assumed. Even the
field's founders recognized that their arguments are valid only
subject to several restrictive conditions: allocation and redis-
tribution decisions must not affect marginal values; goods must
be freely substitutable; property rights must be well defined and
enforceable; and goods must be fungible, which is to say that
people must be indifferent as to whether they own one as op-
posed to another specific item of a given good.4 While it may be
plausible to suppose that some goods, such as the economists'
proverbial bushels of wheat, are completely fungible, it is much
less likely that a family home, a limb, or the Grand Canyon have
ready substitutes. Owners prize these and similar amenities
precisely because they are unique.
Few studies have explored the relationship between legal
rights and economic allocation for goods that have no close
substitutes. But as American environmental protection efforts
expanded in the last decade, environmental valuation issues
raised problems for conventional law-and-economics analysis. To
implement federal environmental statutes, it became necessary
to determine the value of unique natural resources such as
national parks, rivers, beaches, and wilderness vistas. However,
standard markets and other observable economic behavior rarely
reflect the value of environmental goods. Environmental re-
searchers therefore turned to non-behavioral methods of valuing
resources, in particular, to survey methods such as contingent
valuation, or "CV." CV estimates the value of a good or service,
such as a natural resource, by surveying how much a representa-
tive sample population values the good or service.5
A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory 192 (McGraw-Hill, 1978). See also Elizabeth Hoffman
and Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 Colum L
Rev 991, 1010 (1985). As discussed below, this implies that either the income effect must
be zero, the substitution effect must be infinite, or both. For a discussion of the implica-
tions for judicial roles in settling disputes when such conditions apply, see id at 1009-13;
Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 29-41. The dominant laissez-faire
approach has been attacked on the grounds that it is inherently ideological and that the
necessary assumptions for its validity are unrealistic. See, for example, Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S Cal L
Rev 669, 673-97 (1979); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 9-24
(summarizing these criticisms).
' See, for example, Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15; Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L
Rev at 1093-98.
' Modern contingent valuation methods evolved from interviews asking respondents
to value natural resources. This technique was first proposed in S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup,
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As researchers developed this new measurement technique,
they discovered that the estimated value of a given natural
resource could vary by three hundred to nearly two thousand
percent, depending on the specific wording of the survey and the
implied underlying property rights.' Many commentators have
documented this variability and investigated its causes.! Several
attempts to reconcile these results with mainstream law-and-
economics theory followed, but none has been completely success-
fUl.
s
Recent theoretical work suggests that part of the observed
variance in natural resource valuation arises from the fact that
natural resources are often almost pure examples of goods that
have no close substitutes, what we will call "less-substitutable"
goods.9 Economic principles in fact predict that the value of
these goods will vary as property rights differ. ° Put simply, if
the public views itself as the owner of a natural resource, valu-
ation estimates will be much higher than if the public believes
that others own the natural resource. Successfully implementing
America's burgeoning environmental protection regime therefore
requires new analyses appropriate for less-substitutable goods.
Furthermore, a theory of less-substitutable good valuation devel-
oped for environmental law may stimulate a general reconsidera-
tion of the interplay between property rights and economic
allocation in American law.
Capital Returns from Soil Conservation Practices, 29 J Farm Econ 1181 (1947), and
analyzed more extensively in Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation: Economics and
Policies (California, 1952). For a comprehensive discussion of the history, application, and
theoretical problems with CV, see Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, Using
Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (Resources for the
Future, 1989); Richard C. Bishop and Thomas A. Heberlein, The Contingent Valuation
Method, in Rebecca L. Johnson and Gary V. Johnson, eds, Economic Valuation of Natural
Resources 80-104 (Westview, 1990).
6 For a comprehensive discussion of this divergence, see Edward J. Yang, et al, eds,
The Use of Economic Analysis in Valuing Natural Resource Damages 30-32 (National
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 1984) ("NOAA Report"). The NOAA Report shows,
for example, that if people have the right to such amenities as a day's saltwater fishing
trip, they will demand nineteen times more compensation to sell their right than they
would be willing to pay to acquire the right in the first place. Id at 31. In general, this
divergence can range from three to twenty times the lower value. Id at 31, 62.
See notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
8 See notes 74-76 and accompanying text. But see W. Michael Hanemann, Willing-
ness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 Am Econ Rev 635
(1991); Richard T. Carson, Constructed Markets, in John B. Braden and Charles D.
Kolstad, eds, Measuring the Demand for Environmental Quality 128-30 (Elsevier Science,
1991).
' See generally Hanemann, 81 Am Econ Rev 635.
10 See text accompanying notes 81-83.
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This Article focuses on the problems associated with the use
of CV in environmental law. Like other valuation techniques, CV
typically seeks to estimate the total value respondents place on a
change in an environmental good. CV is an alternative to market
information for goods that are not easily traded, such as natural
parks or rivers, that surveys how much a representative sample
population values such amenities. Respondents are usually asked
either how much they are willing to pay ("WTP") to clean up or
preserve a natural resource, or, alternatively, how much they are
willing to accept ("WTA") to forgo their existing rights to the
amenity." The survey results are then aggregated and statisti-
cally analyzed to produce a measurement of the resource's overall
value. 2
From the outset, and throughout extensive empirical re-
search, CV practitioners have observed that WTA questions
almost always elicit much higher valuations than do WTP que-
ries." As will be discussed, WTA and WTP questions imply
different property rights to the resource involved: WTA suggests
that the public (respondent) owns the resource, while WTP sug-
gests that they do not. Yet CV practitioners, in keeping with the
conventional perspective that property rights should have little
effect on value, have shown relatively little recognition of these
implications. Instead, they often attribute WTA-WTP differences
to survey error or respondent bias. But recent work has shown
that the WTA-WTP divergence may demonstrate that for less-
substitutable goods, including various public goods, value varies
sharply as property rights change.
We argue that in dealing with less-substitutable goods, it is
not possible to select the appropriate form of CV survey or inter-
pret the resulting estimates without first undertaking a legal
analysis of the rights to the good in question. This creates new
problems for CV analysts, because specifying public rights in
national land, air, and water amenities is becoming more com-
plex. If, as appears likely, less-substitutable goods become in-
creasingly significant in American jurisprudence, the realization
" For a recent survey of the WTP and the WTA issues in CV analysis, see Mitchell
and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 30-41 (cited in note 5). WTA is
sometimes signified in CV literature as willingness to sell ("WTS").
2 For a detailed explanation of the statistical computations used to ensure the reli-
ability of CV results, see id at 220-28.
13 See Ronald G. Cummings, et al, Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of
the Contingent Valuation Method 35-36 (Rowman & Allanheld, 1986); Mitchell and Car-
son, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 30-38.
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of environmental and other national objectives may require a
major reconsideration of the law and economics of property rights
and valuation.
Part I of this Article describes how CV, once an obscure
experimental technique, emerged as the method of choice to
perform valuations of a group of increasingly important environ-
mental goods. Part II argues that, contrary to early theories, the
divergence between WTP and WTA survey results observed for
some less-substitutable goods is consistent with standard econ-
omic theory. The value of less-substitutable goods, including
some important publicly-held natural resources, will vary with
the allocation of property rights. In Part III, we explain that
public rights in national assets have become increasingly unclear.
As a result, litigation to define such rights could soon dramatical-
ly increase the costs of-and delay-America's environmental
protection efforts. Legislative intervention may be necessary to
avoid this outcome. The Article concludes with some thoughts on
how the resolution of natural resource valuation issues in envi-
ronmental law may eventually influence American jurisprudence
more generally.
I. CONTINGENT VALUATION APPLICATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
Contingent valuation surveys, first suggested in 1947, were
applied to practical problems in the 1960s. 4 Soon after its in-
ception, several criticisms of CV arose. Economists questioned
whether structured surveys could measure the value of goods as
accurately as market prices could."5 Commentators also feared
that either the form of the survey itself would distort observed
consumer preferences, or that the respondents might provide
false data for strategic reasons. 6 In response, CV proponents
tried to test the accuracy of the technique by comparing survey-
generated values to known market prices for specific goods. 7
'4 See note 5. While Ciriacy-Wantrup is credited with inventing the CV method, its
first practical application came with economist Robert Davis's attempts to estimate the
recreation benefits of woods in Maine. See Robert K. Davis, Recreation Planning as an
Economic Problem, 3 Nat Res J 239, 245 (1963).
5 See, for example, Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36
Rev Econ & Stat 387 (1954).
1 See the discussion and materials cited in Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to
Value Public Goods at 153-70 (cited in note 5).
17 See, for example, Peter Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experi-
ment, 3 Eur Econ Rev 111 (1972); Richard C. Bishop and Thomas A. Heberlein, Does
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Additional work attempted to demonstrate that CV surveys could
be fine-tuned to reduce the more obvious forms of respondent
bias. 8 Despite promising results, many of the major issues
about the method remain unresolved even after three decades of
basic research. 9
CV might well have remained an experimental curiosity but
for America's emerging environmental protection regime, which
required dramatic changes in valuation methodology." The
Clean Water Act ("CWA") in 1977,21 and then later CERCLA22
and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),' required new methods of valu-
ing natural resources for which economic markets did not exist.
In spite of continuing controversy over its validity, 4 CV became
one of the primary methods of valuation.
CV achieved its prominence for three reasons. First, unlike
more standard valuation methods, CV seemed responsive to theo-
Contingent Valuation Work?, in Cummings, et al, Valuing Environmental Goods at 123
(cited in note 13); Richard C. Bishop, et al, Contingent Valuation of Environmental Assets:
Comparisons with a Simulated Market, 23 Nat Res J 619 (1983); Mark Dickie, et al,
Market Transactions and Hypothetical Demand Data: A Comparative Study, 82 J Am Stat
Assn 69 (1987).
1" See Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 231-32 (cited in
note 5).
' Many CV practitioners regard the method as still in its developmental stage. See,
for example, V. Kerry Smith, To Keep or Toss the Contingent Valuation Method, in
Cummings, et al, Valuing Environmental Goods at 162, 176 (cited in note 13) ("[Wle can
draw no conclusions on [the] accuracy [of CVI based on what we know from research to
date."); Raymond J. Kopp, Forward, in Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value
Public Goods at xvi ("The contingent valuation method is still in its infancy and research
regarding appropriate application procedures and tests of reliability are under way."). The
broader range of social-science researchers may view CV with even more skepticism.
' See Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 13-14.
21 33 USC §§ 1251-1387 (1988). The CWA originated in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948, Pub L No 80-845, 62 Stat 1155 (1948). Congress amended that Act
several times. The 1977 amendments provided the alternative title, Clean Water Act,
which has largely superseded the original title. See Pub L No 95-217, § 1, 91 Stat 1566
(1977).
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986), codified at
42 USC §§ 9601-57 (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
42 USC §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp IV 1992). The original Clean Air Act, 69 Stat
322 (1955), was completely revised by Pub L No 95-96, 91 Stat 685 (1977).
24 For a comprehensive treatment of methodological problems in the application of
CV, as exemplified by the problem of valuing Grand Canyon visibility rights, see Daniel S.
Levy, et al, Conceptual and Statistical Issues in Contingent Valuation: Estimating the
Value of Altered Visibility in the Grand Canyon, RAND MR-344-RC (Aug 1993 draft) (on
file with U Chi L Rev) ("RAND Report"). For more general accounts of methodological
problems, see Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 9-14, 295-306;
Cummings, et al, Valuing Environmental Goods at 111-236.
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retical concerns over natural resource valuation. Second, a battle
over regulatory politics culminated in an endorsement of CV by
the Department of the Interior. Finally, litigants began to employ
CV strategically to create leverage in complex environmental
litigation.
A. Theories of Natural Resource Valuation and CV
The CWA and CERCLA forced economists to revise standard
thinking about valuation in legal contexts. To enforce national
environmental goals, both Acts permitted government plaintiffs,
for the first time, to recover damages for harm to natural re-
sources caused by the discharge of hazardous materials.' Defin-
ing potential damage liability under the Acts proved highly con-
tentious: how much should a polluter pay for damage caused to
an isolated and rarely-used beach, forest, or stream? Predictably,
industry representatives (and the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions) tried to limit natural resource damages under the CWA
and CERCLA to only those elements of value that could be mea-
sured by finctioning markets." Environmentalists argued for
much more expansive valuation techniques which would include,
and go beyond, market measures. 7
The first widely applicable damage provisions for harm to natural resources were
§§ 311(f)(4) and (f)(5) of the CWA, codified at 33 USC § 1321(f)(4) and (f)(5). CWA damag-
es cover the release of hazardous substances or oil, including "any costs or expenses
incurred by the Federal Government or any State government in the restoration or
replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed." 33 USC § 1321(f)(4). While the
statute had apparently been intended to award damages at least equal to resource resto-
ration costs, the Department of the Interior adopted regulations reflecting a more limited
interpretation. See text accompanying notes 39-63.
The damage provision of CERCLA is 42 USC § 9607(f)(1). Under CERCLA, discharg-
ers of hazardous substances may be held liable for "damages for injury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable cost of assessing such injury, de-
struction or loss resulting from such a release." 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(C). SARA amended
CERCLA to provide that "in any case in which any provision of § 311 of the CWA [33 USC
§ 1321]. is determined to be in conflict with any provision of CERCLA, the provisions of
CERCLA still apply." 42 USC § 9654(c). Thus, case law, regulations, or other authorities
pertaining to natural resource damage recoveries under CERCLA also govern damage
actions under § 311 of the CWA.
Under both the CWA and CERCLA, the federal government or any affected state
may sue to recover these damages as a "trustee" of the public interest in the resource. 33
USC § 1321(f)(5) (CWA); 42 USC § 9607(f)(1) (CERCLA).
' See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand L Rev 269, 280-
97 (1989); Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts,
16 BC Envir Aff L Rev 405, 440-56 (1989). These provide excellent reviews of the method-
ological, theoretical, and ideological debates surrounding the development of natural
resources valuation principles under the CWA and CERCLA.
' See Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 285-97.
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The valuation debate centered on the fact that many natural
resources are not readily, if ever, traded on functioning markets.
To some economists, market-determined prices are the only reli-
able, legally significant measures of value.' To them, if a good
is traded and sold, it has measurable worth; to the extent it is
not so traded, it has no measured value. In this view, the value
of a natural resource is the sum of the value of all of its associat-
ed marketable commodities, such as timber, minerals, animals,
and recreational use fees. Thus, harm to a heavily used, com-
mercially exploitable national forest would generate significant
damage liability, while pollution of isolated, unproductive envi-
ronments, no matter how rare or beautiful, would not.29
Although reliance on market valuation to obtain a reliable
estimate of some types of damages is methodologically consistent
with mainstream economics, many balked at the possibility that
the exclusive reliance on market methods would not measure the
harm to national natural treasures unless the resources were
traded on economic markets. ° They argued that even rarely
used, noncommercial resources, such as scenic vistas or Alaskan
beaches, possess significant, tangible value to the American pub-
lic.
In response to these concerns, certain researchers developed
new categories for elements of natural resource value that con-
ventional damage theories could not easily accommodate."1 The
concept of "use value" was created to designate pure market mea-
See id at 281-85; Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 59-
67 (cited in note 5).
' For example, consider two islands. One is readily accessible, heavily forested with
high-quality redwood groves, and surrounded by oceans teeming with swordfish and
salmon. The other is hard to visit and supports little timber and few commercial fisheries.
Under conventional market-based economic analysis, damages for a massive oil spill
followed by a fire that destroyed the vegetation, beaches, and fish of both of these islands
would equal the sum of the exploitable resources lost by the first island, while the second
island would have no legally significant damages.
In the influential decision Ohio v United States Department of the Interior, 880 F2d
432, 445 (DC Cir 1989), the court discussed the inadequacy of pure market measures:
"Interior could not possibly maintain that recovering $15 per pelt for fur seals killed by
hazardous substance release would enable the purchase of an 'equivalent' number of fur
seals." For further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 49-63.
30 See Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 271-72.
' For a summary of the debate over basic theoretical and practical issues behind the
different categories of natural resource value, see id at 280-97; Mitchell and Carson,
Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 55-67. Economists have not used new natural
resource valuation terminology consistently. For example, concepts of option value or
existence value are often subject to considerable nuance, and some economists use the
same terms in contradictory ways. See Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 281 n 53.
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sures, such as natural resource commodity prices or recreational
fee revenues.32 A second category, "existence value" was invent-
ed to represent the extent that people enjoy benefits from, and
would be willing to pay for, the knowledge that remote, pristine
environments such as Alaskan wildlife refuges or deep-sea volca-
nic reefs simply exist.3 There are three subcategories of exis-
tence value: (1) "option value," which represents the amount that
people would be willing to pay to ensure an amenity's survival so
that they might have the chance to enjoy it in the future-a
family in Florida, for example, might derive utility from the
knowledge that a continent away, Yosemite was being main-
tained for their potential future use; (2) "vicarious value," mea-
suring the appreciation of others' use of the resource; and (3)
"intertemporal value," measuring anticipation of the use of the
resource by future generations.34 Finally, the notion of "intrinsic
value" was developed to represent the inherent value of natural
resources, considered independently of human existence or
use.35 Discussions of this last category often take on a meta-
physical tone, with commentators citing religious and philosophi-
cal works to describe it.
36
As this new typology of natural resource valuation gained
credibility, CV attracted attention because it, alone among sever-
al alternative techniques, appeared to measure existence values
(especially option values) as well as use values. 7 Unlike market
' See Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 281-85.
33 Id at 285-92.
. Id.
Id at 292-97.
See, for example, id (citing St. Francis of Assisi and Jeremy Bentham).
CV specialists, reviewing recent court decisions affirming the use of CV for envi-
ronmental evaluations, concluded that "[slince contingent valuation techniques are the
only way known to measure [ ] nonuse damages, they will play a key role in determining
the magnitude of awards in certain cases." Raymond J. Kopp, et al, Natural Resource
Damages: The Economics Have Shifted After Ohio v. United States Department of the
Interior, 20 Envir L Rptr 10127, 10130 (1990).
Alternative techniques for valuing natural resources include direct consumer behav-
ior measures, such as the amount people pay to use the resources in question, and hedon-
ic price valuation, which assesses the impact of a natural resource on a marketed re-
source. Direct measures, which in effect aggregate the costs associated with accessing a
natural resource, including "travel expenses, entrance fees, the opportunity cost of travel
time invested, and similar travel-related costs," suffer from numerous conceptual prob-
lems. See Anderson, 16 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 444 (cited in note 26). Such measures are
reasonable indicators of overall resource value only if access costs are significant relative
to the total value of the resource, a questionable assumption. Further, it is extremely
difficult to value travel time and opportunity costs, as the method requires. Id.
Hedonic price valuation faces other difficulties. A typical use of this method would
compare the price of similar homes in polluted and non-polluted areas to isolate the
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or related measurement techniques, CV surveys can directly ask
respondents how much they would pay to obtain, or accept to
sell, their right to each of these aspects of the value of the re-
source. In theory, surveys can be worded so that the answers
reflect the sum of the respondents' use, existence, and intrinsic
values." Consequently, as the frequency of environmental dam-
age disputes rose, the practical application of CV surveys also in-
creased.
B. Regulatory Politics and the Judicial Validation of CV
Regulatory conflicts, particularly the bitter litigation over
regulations implementing the damage provisions of the CWA and
CERCLA, promoted the use of CV. The Acts directed the Presi-
dent, who delegated the job to the Department of the Interior
("DOI"), to formulate damage valuation rules by December,
1982."9 The Acts required two types of rules. For special sites,
"Type A" rules set out "standard procedures for simplified assess-
ments requiring minimal field observations." 0 In practice, Type
A rules are used only for oil spills in aquatic environments.4'
For all other locations, primarily major spills requiring site-spe-
cific damage valuation,42 "Type B" rules provide "alternative pro-
tocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to deter-
mine ... short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss."" The
Acts authorize the executive branch to identify the best available
procedures to determine both types of damages." Political con-
troversy has centered on Type B procedures, because they affect
the vast majority of cases.
The DOI pursued its rulemaking function lethargically. The
agency did not adopt Type B rules until 1986, four years after
the initial deadline.45 Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the
effects of pollution on value. When a natural resource is involved, it is difficult to find a
marketable commodity that will reflect its value. For example, the price of a house located
near the Grand Canyon might decline as a result of certain types of environmental
damage, but it would be difficult to separate the effect of, say, changes in visibility quality
from the effects of other factors.
See, for example, Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 315-20 (cited in note 26).
3' See 42 USC § 9651(c)(1); Exec Order No 12316 § 8(c)(3).
40 42 USC § 9651(c)(2).
41 See Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 321 n 273.
412 Id at 321-22.
43 42 USC § 9651(c)(2).
4 Id.
4' Final rules were adopted in August, 1986. Natural Resource Damage Assessments,
Final Rule, 51 Fed Reg 27,720 (1986), codified at 43 CFR §§ 11.10-11.93 (1992). The initial
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Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"),
amending CERCLA and the damage provisions of the CWA si-
multaneously.46 SARA gave the DOI six months to revise its
damage assessment regulations to conform with the amend-
ments." Two years later, the DOI published and adopted re-
vised Type B rules, which were challenged in court by state gov-
ernments, environmentalists, and industry groups."
After years of procedural and substantive wrangling, the
D.C. Circuit finally settled the regulations dispute in Ohio v
United States Department of the Interior, which clarified the
theory of natural-resource value embodied in the DOI rules.49 As
adopted, the Type B rules had provided that damages for harm to
natural resources would be measured by "the lesser of [ ] restora-
tion or replacement costs or diminution of use values."0 Envi-
ronmentalists objected that this formulation would greatly under-
value damage to natural resources because use measures would
almost always be less than the cost of completely restoring a
natural amenity.51 They argued that, in effect, the rules simply
excised non-market measures such as option or existence values
from the damage assessment formula.
The DOI rules also created a hierarchy of valuation meth-
ods.52 Plaintiffs suing for natural resource damages could use
CV surveys only if use values or other market methodologies
deadline was December 11, 1982. 42 USC § 9651(c)(1). For a brief history of the process of
DOI rulemaking with regard to the damage provisions of the CWA and CERCLA, see
Ohio, 880 F2d at 440.
46 See note 25. See also Ohio, 880 F2d at 439-40 (describing the effects of SARA on
CERCLA damage provisions).
'T See 42 USC § 9651(c)(1).
" The DOI issued revised regulations in February 1988. 53 Fed Reg 5,166 (1988). See
Ohio, 880 F2d at 440. Similar groups had also challenged the pre-amendment rules. Id.
49 880 F2d 432 (DC Cir 1989). The major issue in Ohio was whether pure-use value
measures or measures reflecting resource restoration costs best reflected congressional
intent in CWA and CERCLA damages. See id at 459. But the litigation over the valuation
regulations also involved other complex, highly technical matters. Among the issues
ultimately decided by the D.C. Circuit were whether the DOts requirement that damage
assessors consider only the resource's "committed uses" was consistent with congressional
intent, id at 461-62; whether the DOI's decision to use a 10 % discount rate to calculate
the net present value of future injury costs was appropriate, id at 464-65; whether permit-
ring potential defendants in a CERCLA action to conduct preliminary damage assess-
ments was improperly preferential, id at 465-68; whether the DOrs limitations of poten-
tial asseisment recoveries were proper, id at 468; and whether the DOI's regulations
adopted an overly-stringent test for damage causation, id at 468-473.
43 CFR § 11.35(b)(2) (1992).
51 Ohio, 880 F2d at 441-42.
52 See 43 CFR §§ 11.83(c)-(d). See also Ohio, 880 F2d at 462-64.
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could not reasonably be applied to their cases.53 Meanwhile, in-
dustry interests, while generally pleased with the DOI's "lesser
of' rule, strenuously resisted any legitimation of CV because of
the huge potential damage measures CV surveys were known to
generate.' They challenged the inclusion of CV in the regula-
tions on the grounds that the method was speculative and inferi-
or to other available valuation procedures.55
In Ohio, the court adopted the environmentalists' position
that natural resource damage measures must include more than
use valuation to be consistent with Congressional intent." The
court struck down the DOI's "lesser of" rule, on the grounds that,
in practice, it would limit natural resource damages to values
measurable in functioning markets.57 Instead, the court took the
position that the real value of natural resources extends beyond
the sum of their marketable commodities.5" Looking to the lan-
guage of CERCLA and the CWA, which mandated recoveries to
compensate for the full effects of environmental harm, the court
found the DOT's rules inconsistent with Congressional intent
because the rule would undervalue resources.59 The Court there-
fore instructed the DOI to revise the Type B rules to develop
damage assessment methodologies that measured more than
merely use values. 0
The court also rejected the industrialists' challenge to the
inclusion of CV in the DOI regulations.6 It dismissed their ar-
guments that CV was unreliable or generated inflated damage
measures as striking "at CERCLA, not CV's implementation,"
and therefore appropriately considered "only by Congress."62 To
'3 See 43 CFR § 11.83(d).
See Ohio, 880 F2d at 476.
Id at 476-78. For example, industry petitioners contended that CV was unreliable
because it generated such remarkably high estimates of resource value. As evidence, they
cited a study that estimated the option and existence value of whooping cranes in Texas
at $109 million (or approximately seven dollars for each resident of the state), a result
they derided as unjustifiably high. Id at 477 n 86.
56 Id at 462-64.
7 Id at 455-59.
8 Id at 462-64.
'9 Id at 450.
60 Id at 481.
" Id at 478. The DOrs regulations defined CV as "all techniques that set up hypo-
thetical markets to elicit an individual's economic valuation of a natural resource." 43
CFR § 11.83(d)(5)(i). The court discussed at length the theory and practice of CV, noting
that it was the only method recognized by practitioners as being reasonably effective in
eliciting existence and option values. 880 F2d at 475-76.
62 Ohio, 880 F2d at 477.
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the extent that Congress required environmental polluters to pay
the full costs of the harm they cause, the court found CV surveys
to be perfectly consistent with the intent of the CWA and
CERCLA, because in theory CV measures such costs more com-
pletely than do other methods.' Consequently, the court upheld
the DOts inclusion of CV as a method for assessing Type B dam-
ages.
C. Environmental Litigation Strategy and CV
A final cause of the rapid growth of CV in environmental law
is the use of CV surveys to obtain strategic advantages in envi-
ronmental litigation, even where damages are not explicitly at
issue. Plaintiffs and defendants alike use CV surveys more and
more frequently to provide best- or worst-case assessments of the
costs of regulatory compliance or possible settlements. Low CV
results provide an argument against expensive retrofit programs
or investments in pollution-reducing technology. Meanwhile, both
private and government plaintiffs in environmental actions use
high-damage CV estimates to compel settlements with recalci-
trant defendants.
For example, while the CAA requires that the "best available
retrofit technology" be employed to reduce air pollution in certain
locations, it has no damage provisions; the act is simply remedi-
al. ' But when the costs of compliance are quite high, as in the
case of efforts to reduce airborne pollutants from power plants
near the Grand Canyon, affected parties have resorted to CV
analyses in an attempt to limit the extent of the remedial invest-
ments they must make." If investments to clean up Grand Can-
63 Id.
" The CAA requires that major stationary sources existing on or after August 7,
1977, and that have been in operation less than 15 years, must use the best available
retrofit technology to mitigate air pollution if they contribute, or can reasonably be antici-
pated to contribute, to any impairment of visibility in certain designated class 1 areas,
which include national parks and any other unique natural resources. CAA §
169A(b)(2)(A), codified at 42 USC § 7491(b)(2)(A). Apart from this remedial function, the
CAA is unique among the major environmental statutes in that it expressly awards no
damages for harm to air quality. See generally David P. Currie, Air Pollution: Federal
Law & Analysis § 8.14 (Callaghan, 1981 & Supp 1991).
' In 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency invited public comment on the issue
of whether the Agency should require the Navajo Generating Station to use the best
available retrofit technology to reduce its emissions, which have been shown to impair
wintertime visibility in the Grand Canyon. The Canyon is a class 1 area under § 162(a) of
the CAA, 42 USC § 7472(a). See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Approv-
al and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Revision of the Visibility Federal Im-
plementation Plan for Arizona, 56 Fed Reg 5173-90 (1991) (proposing amendments to 40
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yon air would cost $500 million, and CV studies indicate that the
public values pristine Grand Canyon air at only $200 million,
polluters will offer the CV analysis to define an upper limit for
CAA compliance.
At the same time, plaintiffs can use CV studies to compel
rapid compliance and settlement in remedial environmental dis-
putes triggered by major oil spills or other disasters.6' Because
of the enormous costs' of simply cleaning up these harms, envi-
ronmental offenders might well choose to litigate rather than
settle at the outset of an action. CV analyses suggesting substan-
tial ultimate liability can give plaintiffs the leverage needed to
induce recalcitrant parties to settle, making immediate payments
available to mitigate damage.
Theoretical, regulatory, and strategic developments therefore
virtually guarantee that litigants will continue to introduce CV
surveys into environmental disputes in the future. Indeed, CV
practitioners have already become standard players on most
major environmental litigation teams. Still, questions persist
concerning the relationship of property rights to measures of
natural resource value. Until these issues are resolved, CV re-
sults may be misleading at best, and at worst entirely contrary to
the legislative intent behind federal environmental statutes.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC VALUES: WHY WTP AND
WTA RESULTS DIFFER
One of the most significant problems with using CV to value
natural resources is the dramatic divergence between survey
results based on WTP ("willing to pay") and WTA ("willing to
accept") questions. Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated
that WTA questions generate values from three to nineteen times
CFR § 52 (AD-FRL-3700-4)). At issue was the extent to which the EPA should require the
station to invest in pollution-reducing technology, given that estimates of the value of
clean air in the Grand Canyon vary. For a summary and critique of the CV studies
presented, see RAND Report (cited in note 24).
' It is difficult to obtain precise information regarding the use of CV in large-scale
environmental disaster cases, such as the Exxon Valdez and Sacramento River spills, be-
cause the litigants frequently insist that the studies remain sealed during and even after
the course of litigation. However, journalistic accounts and the publication of related
research suggest that both plaintiffs and defendants employ CV surveys in such actions to
generate leverage in settlement negotiations. See, for example, Carla Marinucci, Putting a
Price on Pollution: Environmental Economists Figure the Cost of Clean Air, Clean Water,
San Fran Examiner El (Aug 4, 1991); Jerry A. Hausman, ed, Contingent Valuation: A
Critical Assessment (Elsevier Science, 1993).
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greater than those elicited by WTP queries. 7 Each form of ques-
tion clearly implies different property rights. In a WTA format,
the respondents are asked to specify the price for which they will
sell their existing rights to an amenity, allowing some form of
degradation of the good, or foregoing some improvement. WTA
surveys thus assume that respondents already own implicit
rights to the amenity at issue.6" WTP, in contrast, supposes that
the respondents do not yet have the right to enjoy an amenity in
a certain condition; instead, people are asked the most they
would pay to obtain a right to have the amenity improved or to
prevent its degradation. WTP questions presume that individuals
other than the respondents have the right to the resource in
question. 9 However, CV practitioners generally have not accept-
ed that the WTA-WTP difference results from the different legal
contexts implied by their choice of survey questions.70 Instead,
consistent with conventional law and, until recently, economic
theory, they simply treated the WTP-WTA divergence as error.71
In the end, WTA has been generally discarded in favor of the
seemingly more reliable WTP methodology.72
Dismissing the WTA-WTP problem in this fashion, we argue,
is wrong for a group of goods that may be considered unique or
'less-substitutable." WTA and WTP estimates of the value of
unique goods should vary significantly, because WTA and WTP
imply different property rights. In fact, CV practitioners cannot
See note 6.
See generally Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 30
(cited in note 5). Mitchell and Carson review the literature concerning WTP and WTA
divergence and the attempts to explain this result without reference to differential proper-
ty rights. Id at 34-38. They are also noteworthy for their attempt to address the property
rights issue and to justify the use of WTP on the basis of "a new property rights ap-
proach." See discussion in Section III.C. and Carson, Constructed Markets at 130 (cited in
note 8).
" See Hanemann, 81 Am Econ Rev at 635-47 (cited in note 8); NOAA Report at 31
(cited in note 6).
7" NOAA Report at 31.
71 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J Legal Stud
225, 225-29 (1991). Hovenkamp explains that the WTA-WTP difference is traditionally
explained as an income effect of the respondent's change in property rights. Since money
added to income has diminishing marginal utility, the respondent would not be willing to
accept less for the right than she would be willing to pay. This theory, however, may not
account for the magnitude of the difference between WTA and WTP survey values. Id at
226.
72 See Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measure-
ment of Nonuse Values, in Jerry A. Hausman, ed, Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assess-
ment 3-38 (Elsevier Science, 1993) (stating that the "persistent difference" between WTA
and WTP results "casts doubt on the entire enterprise").
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
properly analyze the value of goods, including many natural
resources, until the underlying property rights applicable to the
amenity involved are specified. Depending on who "owns" the
natural resources at issue, either WTA or WTP questions reflect
the conceptually appropriate legal and economic CV questions to
value a less-substitutable good. And given the magnitude of the
WTA-WTP divergence, the failure to employ the appropriate CV
question may impart a severe bias to the valuation of the good.73
Economists initially proposed several explanations for the
large difference between WTA and WTP responses, believing that
standard economic theory provided little justification for the
results.74 Some argued that WTA was just more difficult for re-
spondents to consider than WTP: as respondents gained experi-
ence in CV procedures, WTA results would converge on WTP.75
But attempts to demonstrate this proposition empirically have
been unsatisfying. Even in repeated-bid experiments in which
respondents engaged in several successive surveys, statistically
significant variance between WTA and WTP responses could not
be eliminated.76
Psychological theories may also help to explain the diver-
gence between responses to WTP and WTA questions. For exam-
ple, "prospect theory" postulates that individuals simply dislike
losses more than they like gains of equal magnitude.77 CV re-
spondents therefore require more compensation to avoid the
amenity loss implied by typical WTA questions than to purchase
the same amenity as WTP queries usually suppose.
" For an argument that the allocation of rights reflected by WTA or WTP perspec-
tives crucially affects public welfare decisions and social efficiency outcomes, see
Hovenkamp, 20 J Legal Stud 225 (cited in note 71).
' See Alan Randall and John R. Stoll, Consumer's Surplus in Commodity Space, 70
Am Econ Rev 449 (1980). For a discussion of four different attempts to explain the WTP-
WTA divergence, see Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 34-38
(cited in note 5).
71 See, for example, Don L. Coursey, et al, The Disparity Between Willingness to
Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value, 102 Q J Econ 679 (1987). Coursey and
his co-authors investigated the difference between WTP and WTA in a repeated bid
experiment and claimed to find that, after a series of repeated closed-bid auctions,
respondents' WTA and WTP converged. Although WTP did increase slightly, most of the
change was observed in WTA, which declined by about half. Id at 688.
"' See Robin Gregory and Lita Furby, Auctions, Experiments and Contingent Valua-
tion, 55 Public Choice 273, 280-85 (1987) (analyzing the data from the Coursey experi-
ment and finding that WTA and WTP valuations were statistically different even in the
last rounds of bids).
" The leading work is Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979).
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Although prospect theory suggests a mechanism that may
help us understand why WTP responses differ so greatly from
WTA responses, the losses and gains which are so critical to
prospect theory do not coincide uniquely with the WTP and WTA
question forms.78 Prospect theory's explanation for the diver-
gence between WTA and WTP assumes that the WTA question
reflects a loss while WTP reflects a gain. Any WTA (or WTP)
question, however, can be rephrased as a WTP (or WTA) query.
For example, a standard WTA survey might ask respondents
how much they would have to be paid to give up their current
rights to clean air. The same situation can also be expressed as a
WTP question: respondents could instead be asked how much
they would pay to avoid a loss of the air quality they currently
enjoy. Since each form of the question implies the same degree of
loss, under prospect theory, the respondents' answers should be
similar in magnitude. Irrespective of WTP or WTA language,
answers to questions that involve losses should tend to converge,
as should all of those implying only gains. While a careful coding
of existing WTA-WTP survey results into loss or gain categories
has yet to be performed, the obvious trend of the available evi-
dence is that CV surveys are in fact highly sensitive to the form
of WTP and WTA questions.79 This indicates that something
other than (or at least in addition to) the fear of loss explains the
observed valuation response divergence.
Although both prospect theory and recent developments in
economics' partially explain the WTA-WTP divergence, without
a definition of property rights neither approach provides a princi-
pled rationale for selecting one form of question over another.
The determination of the conceptually appropriate form of CV
query is a matter of property rights, not economics or psychology.
Recent work shows that when goods do not have close substi-
tutes, and when the income elasticity of demand for the good is
large, WTA and WTP should differ greatly in accordance with the
property rights implied by each question.8' The large divergence
' For a discussion of the various hypotheses that must be derived and tested to
assess the accuracy of prospect theory on which the following section relies, see RAND
Report at 9-14 (cited in note 24).
, See note 6.
'o See generally Hanemann, 81 Am Econ Rev 635 (cited in note 8).
" The following discussion draws heavily on the work of Hanemann, 81 Am Econ Rev
635. Hanemann explicitly derives the economic relationships determining the divergence
between WTA and WTP. He demonstrates that, in addition to the elasticity of substitu-
tion, see note 82, between a specific amenity and all other goods that respondents might
consume, the income elasticity of the direct ordinary demand function for the amenity and
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between empirical estimates of WTA and WTP is therefore not in
fact inconsistent with standard economic theory, as previously
believed.
To demonstrate how a good's substitutability and income
elasticity determine whether property rights affect value, consid-
er a simple example of WTP and WTA analysis based on actual
CV studies of visibility in the Grand Canyon. Figure 1 plots
individuals' hypothetical utility curves for visibility in the Grand
Canyon ("VGC") and for all other goods ("AOG"). In the example,
there are two possible levels of visibility in the Grand Canyon,
represented by q1 and qO, with q' > qo (that is, q' represents
cleaner air than qO). "I" represents a given level of income in
terms of all other goods consumed by the respondents. U' and U °
represent two utility levels, with U > U. Given income I and a
level of visibility equal to qO, individuals will enjoy the level of
utility represented at point A on utility curve U0 . Given income I
and a higher level of visibility, q', individuals would achieve
greater utility as represented by point B on utility curve U.
In Figure 1, WTP is the amount of AOG that individuals
would be willing to pay in exchange for an improvement in VGC
without altering their utility levels. For example, utility-maxi-
mizing individuals would be equally happy at points C and A.
They would be willing to reduce their income from I to P in ex-
change for an increase in visibility from qO to q'. The difference,
I - P, is therefore the value of utility-maximizing individuals'
WTP.
WTA is the additional amount individuals would have to
receive in exchange for a reduction in VGC without altering their
utility levels. In Figure 1, utility-maximizing individuals would
be equally happy at points D and B. They would be willing to
reduce the VGC they enjoy from q' to qO in exchange for an in-
crease in AOG from I to I. The difference, I - I, is equal to utili-
ty-maximizing individuals' WTA.
income effects will influence WTA and WTP results. While Hanemann's work explains the
divergence between WTA and WTP in a manner consistent with economics, it does not
constitute empirical evidence that economic factors alone explain the observed phenome-
non. Pending explicit empirical tests, it remains possible that other causes, such as those
described by prospect theory, see text accompanying notes 77-79, explain the results.
It is also important to note that Hanemann's work is not inconsistent with the Coase
Theorem. See text accompanying notes 1-3. The Coase Theorem applies only under spe-
cific assumed conditions concerning the nature of substitutability, transaction costs, and
other economic factors. Hanemann's analysis merely suggests that when goods are
unique, or have fewer close substitutes than the Coase Theorem assumes, a different
relationship between property rights and economic valuation applies.
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Figure 1
A.O.G.
WTA
WTP
V.G.C.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the divergence between WTA and
WTP is, in part, a function of the shape of the utility curves,
which represents the substitutability of VGC for AOG. The great-
er the curvature, the less substitutability exists between VGC
and AOG: the elasticity of substitution between VGC and AOG
dwindles.8 2 For example, as U1 becomes steeper above point B, it
will intersect with the vertical line qO at some point above D,
' Elasticity of substitution measures the responsiveness of consumption of one good
to a change in the price of another good. A large elasticity of substitution between two
goods means that even relatively small changes in the price of one good will result in
large changes in the consumption of the other.
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such as D'. At this point, WTA will increase to equal D - I. Alter-
natively, as U0 becomes flatter below point A, it will intersect the
vertical line q at a higher point, such as C', reducing WTP.
In the extreme case of no substitutability between VGC and
AOG, the utility curves would be right angles: the elasticity of
substitution between VGC and AOG is said to be zero. In this
case it would not be possible to compensate individuals for a
reduction in visibility from q' to qO, because WTA would be infi-
nite. At the same time, an increase in visibility from q0 to q1
would be virtually worthless, because WTP would approach zero.
At the other extreme, perfect substitutability, the utility curves
would be straight lines. At each point, individuals would be per-
fectly indifferent to VGC or AOG exchanges; the elasticity of
substitution is said to be infinite. But as the assumption of per-
fect substitutability is relaxed, curvature will reemerge, once
again generating WTA-WTP differentials. Large differences in
WTA and WTP should occur for goods that do not have close
substitutes.'
The divergence between WTA and WTP also depends upon
the income elasticity of demand for VGC. In simple terms, a
positive income elasticity of VGC means that as an individual's
income increases, he will want to "consume" greater visibility in
the Grand Canyon. Similar increases in consumption associated
with an increase in income are observed for most goods. Some
have argued the income elasticity for certain environmental
goods may be close to zero. For certain environmental goods it
seems plausible that the income elasticity of demand is
small-cleaner Alaskan coastlines may have little or no value to
many people in the lower 48 states. After all, it is possible that
very few people from the lower 48 would travel to some obscure,
barren Alaskan coast, regardless of their wealth.
In contrast, however, millions of people travel to view the
Grand Canyon. For such highly visited resources, it would be
hard to deny the high value the public places on the good. The
likelihood of some positive and appreciable income elasticity of
demand for visibility in the Canyon seems great. It seems proba-
ble that many would consider visibility in the Grand Canyon to
have no close substitutes and that the income elasticity of VGC is
appreciable. Under these conditions, a sizeable divergence be-
tween WTA and WTP can be expected.
Note that as the elasticity of substitution approaches zero, the divergence between.
WTP and WTA should be large even when income effects are small.
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This result makes intuitive sense. It is to be expected that
people will tend to value more highly those items or amenities,
such as their home, limbs, or unique natural resources, that they
have some present right to enjoy and for which ready substitutes
do not exist. One would expect them to demand a large payoff to
give up their rights to enjoy these amenities. In contrast, people
can be expected to find less value in more-substitutable goods, or
goods that in some sense are more easily relaced. In many con-
ventional law-and-economic analyses, one individual unit of a
good is considered freely substitutable because people attach no
special significance to it; one bushel of wheat is the same as all
others. But, apart from the most mundane daily commodities,
individuals unquestionably do develop special attachments to
many of the amenities they enjoy. Such goods are not freely sub-
stitutable, and their owners will demand a premium to sell their
present rights to enjoy them.
We contend that WTA and WTP divergence reflects, in part,
this valuation process. Many goods may have some component of
substitutability. For most goods, in fact, the unique or item-spe-
cific value of the good is a minor or even non-existent portion of
its value. But for some goods, the item-specific value of the good
contains most or even all of its value. There is thus a spectrum of
unique or item-specific value for goods in general.
For example, some individuals may place an item-specific
value on their car. For most individuals, however, the item-spe-
cific value is a small part of the car's value. Our legal system
often ignores this item-specific portion of the value, as, for exam-
ple, in awarding damages in contract and tort. Determining the
item-specific value would be too costly in most cases, and typical-
ly would hardly alter the assessed value of the car. For other
goods, the item-specific value of the good may represent virtually
all of its value. For these goods the divergence between WTA and
WTP may be large, and may represent an important component
of the real value of the good. For this group of goods, which in-
cludes some goods of the type that will be valued with CV, the
choice of WTP or WTA may be very important.
Many CV practitioners have employed the WTP form regard-
less of the conceptually appropriate form of the question, justify-
ing their choice in part with the belief that there was no theoreti-
cal explanation for the observed empirical difference between the
two forms.' But if economic analysis explains why WTA and
' See notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
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WTP responses should differ, this frequently invoked justification
is no longer valid. The proper form of the CV question would
then depend on our understanding of the proper allocation of
initial property rights to the good.
Some CV practitioners, however, may still opt for the use of
WTP queries even where the WTA form is conceptually more
appropriate, believing that the bias introduced by the WTP form
will be small in comparison to other inaccuracies introduced by
the WTA form. These inaccuracies include unrealistically high
average valuations and suspiciously wide variations in responses
among others." This may be the case; however, this belief does
not eliminate the very large potential bias that may be intro-
duced when the conceptually inappropriate form is used.
If WTA and WTP responses differ because of the economic
mechanisms discussed above, then the form of the CV survey
matters crucially. And in any given case, a conceptually appropri-
ate CV survey cannot be designed until the property rights to the
amenity in question have been defined. To return to the example
described in Figure 1, if the public owns the legally significant
rights to clean air in the Grand Canyon, then only WTA ques-
tions are conceptually appropriate. If potential polluters have the
present right to degrade Grand Canyon visibility, then only WTP
questions reflect the property rights defined by the law. In cases
where WTA questions reflect the property rights at issue, WTP
surveys may dramatically undervalue natural resources; where
WTP applies, WTA surveys may overvalue natural resources.86
The choice of the conceptually appropriate form of the ques-
tion, WTP or WTA, thus boils down to a task of defining property
rights. Goods valued with CV often do not have close substiutes,
and in that case cannot be valued apprpriately through this
methodology until the underlying legal rights to the amenity
have been determined. For natural resources like visibility in the
Grand Canyon, defining property rights may seem fortuitously
simple. Many commentators, and even the DOI itself, have taken
for granted that the public is the "owner" of natural resources.8 7
See, for example, Cummings, et al, Valuing Environmental Goods at 37-70 (cited in
note 13).
For a general discussion of the potential under- and over-valuation problems in-
volved in WTP and WTA surveys, see Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 335-39 (cited in note 26).
' For example, the NOAA Report concludes:
When the service of a resource is diminished, asking the user what he should be paid
to accept the reduction seems more appropriate. The concept of [a] public good is that
the good belongs to no one person but rather the public at large. As the public's rep-
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If so, the current near-exclusive use of WTP in environmental
law disputes is inappropriate; when the public own the good,
WTA analysis alone is conceptually appropriate. It is far too
facile, however, to assume that the public owns the legally signif-
icant rights to natural amenities. Instead, public and private
rights in natural resources grow increasingly complex.
III. NEW CHALLENGES TO NATURAL RESOURCE PROPERTY
RIGHTS
The economics of less-substitutable goods suggests that prop-
erty rights must be defined before the valuation of natural re-
sources can be accomplished in a principled way. Accomplishing
this task, however, is more difficult than it appears at first. The
intuitive belief that the public "owns" natural resources is largely
derived from federal common law, which views the public's inter-
ests in government land as precisely analogous to the rights pri-
vate landholders enjoy in their property."5 If this principle were
resentative, the trustee should be considered the rightful owner of the resource and
be awarded a compensation equivalent to the willingness to [accept] on the part of
the public.
NOAA Report at 31 (cited in note 6). Cross concludes:
[Another] reason for selecting [WTA] derives from the context of natural resource
damages. Government seeks to recover damages to resources that the public already
owns. It makes more sense intuitively to view the natural resources as "sold" to the
damaging party, rather than to require the public to "pay" for resources that already
belong to it. The willingness to pay approach is more relevant to enhancing wildlife
opportunities beyond those already extant.
Cross, 42 Vand L Rev at 336 (cited in note 26).
At one time, the DOI proposed that "willingness to accept may be the criterion most
germane to natural resource damages, since the public has the property right to the in-
jured natural resource." 51 Fed Reg 27,721 (1986). The DOI ultimately modified its po-
sition, stating that the application of WTA "can lead to more technical difficulties and
uncertainties than the willingness-to-pay criterion." Id. The DOI concluded that WTA, for
methodological reasons, might yield disproportionally high dollar assessments of natural
resource damages. See Ohio, 880 F2d at 476-77 n 82.
"' In Camfield v United States, 167 US 518, 524 (1897), the Supreme Court granted
the government's motion for summary judgment against a trespasser on federal land,
relying on an analogy between the rights of the government as trustee of public lands and
the rights of a private owner. This conception of public rights in national lands remains
basic federal common law today in non-environmental cases. See United States v Law-
rence, 848 F2d 1502, 1510-12 (10th Cir 1988); United States v Ruckman, 806 F2d 1471,
1472-73 (10th Cir 1986); United States v Osterlund, 505 F Supp 165, 167 (D Colo 1981),
aff'd 671 F2d 1267 (10th Cir 1982).
Federal common-law ownership analysis has been applied in circumstances involving
pollution on public property. Before the enactment of environmental statutes, and their
preemptive effects, see text accompanying notes 90-95, federal courts permitted the
government to enjoin public-land pollution on a nuisance theory, implying that the gov-
ernment in effect "owns" natural resources. See United States v Luce, 141 F 385, 419 (CC
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currently dominant, natural resource valuation would be compar-
atively simple. In most cases of environmental damage, WTA
surveys and other techniques which imply public ownership of
natural resources would be the sole conceptually appropriate
method of valuation.89
But several trends within environmental law have produced
new concepts of natural resource ownership that increasingly
obscure, or conflict with, traditional federal common law princi-
ples. These include: (i) preemption of federal common law by
comprehensive environmental statutes such as the CWA,
CERCLA, and the CAA; (ii) new conceptual challenges to the idea
of public or government ownership of natural resources arising
from complex environmental litigation; (iii) efforts to devise com-
peting theories of property rights applicable to environmental law
(generated in part by CV practitioners seeking to justify the use
of WTP rather than WTA surveys); and (iv) the unsettled nature
of the legal principles of federal land-use management. Thus, as
environmental litigation expands, and rights issues become cen-
tral to multi-million- or billion-dollar lawsuits, it is conceivable
that conflicts over natural resource property rights will hamper
the settlement of environmental disputes. Avoiding this result
may require an explicit legislative effort to determine definitively
the nature of property rights in environmental law contexts.
A. Statutory Preemption of Federal Common Law
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has held that
comprehensive environmental statutes preempt federal common
law. One opinion explained that the principles and remedies
available before the enactment of the CWA were completely dis-
placed after the legislation become effective." The lower courts
Del 1905) ("That the government, in the absence of a plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law has a right to maintain an injunction bill to restrain a nuisance materially
and injuriously affecting the occupancy of its own property there can be no doubt.");
United States v Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F Supp 1215 (D Mont 1979) (denying a motion
to dismiss a government common-law nuisance action to enjoin emissions adversely
affecting air quality in Glacier National Park and Flathead National Forest).
89 Establishing that the government owns a resource, of course, does not definitively
determine the average citizen's personal rights in the property, information necessary to
select the appropriate form of CV analysis. The public's interest in a park, for example, is
more akin to personal ownership than its interest in a top-secret military installation
from which the vast majority of people are rigorously excluded. The relationship between
public and individual interests and the choice of valuation techniques for less-freely sub-
stitutable goods therefore presents additional, and as yet unsettled, practical and legal
problems which this Article does not address.
' In the leading case, City of Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US 304 (1981), the Supreme
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are now in the process of defining the extent of such statutory
displacement. In general, they have held that the CWA and other
water-pollution statutes preempt federal common law in the area
of water pollution, but they remain split on the effects of the
CAA."' The clear trend, however, is to find preemption wherever
complicated statutory initiatives have been passed to govern a
particular environmental issue.
While the Supreme Court's language appears absolute, the
effects of preemption on federal common law principles are still
unclear.92 If the concept of displacement is taken literally, then
federal common law amounts to little more than a stop-gap solu-
tion to federal problems. Once Congress legislates in a specific
area, it nullifies the previously applicable legal principles and
remedies created by federal judges, and the new statute alone
controls all aspects of adjudication.
An alternative perspective is that while statutes prevail over
federal common law when their intent to displace prior law is
unmistakable, in most cases legislation relies on the context
provided by existing legal principles." No statute can completely
redefine or anticipate the various rights or consequences involved
in complex social problems. Basic legal concepts developed
through years of common law adjudication cannot, therefore, be
swept away by legislation. Rather, they comprise the background
principles that inform a statute. Federal common law therefore
supplements and enriches a statutory regime even when pre-
empted.
Court upheld the dismissal of a federal common-law nuisance action to enjoin water
pollution in Lake Michigan, on the ground that the predecessor to the CWA completely
preempted federal common law. Thus, "the need for the unusual exercise of lawmaking by
federal courts" in fashioning remedies for water pollution harm vanished. Id at 314. A
second decision, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 US 1 (1981), further extended the displacement doctrine. The Court suggested that if
the language of a statute even implies that it pertains to matters formerly addressed by
federal common law, common-law principles are preempted. Id at 21-22.
"1 Sea Clammers conclusively determined that the CWA and other water pollution
statutes preempt federal common law. With respect to the CAA, however, the court in
Atlantic-Richfield, 478 F Supp at 1219, found that the government's common-law rights
were not preempted. However, in United States v Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F Supp 699 (D NJ
1982), the court found that the CAA did preempt the federal common law of nuisance as
applied to remedies for air pollution. Since Atlantic-Richfield was decided before the Su-
preme Court's preemption decisions, it is likely that the Kin-Buc position will ultimately
prevail.
The following discussion relies on the analysis presented in William H. Rogers, Jr.,
1 Environmental Law: Air and Water § 2.14 at 120-26 (West, 1986 & Supp 1992).
93 Id at 120-121.
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The complexities created by unsettled preemption questions
greatly complicate the definition of property rights for natural
resource valuation. If federal common law principles remain valid
even after specific rules are preempted, then the traditional no-
tion that the public "owns" natural resources should retain vitali-
ty. But if preemption literally sweeps aside all prior law, then
the applicable property rights must be derived from sources other
than federal common law. One possibility would be to examine
the content and legislative history of the statutes themselves.
This process, however, is always subject to uncertainty. No stat-
ute clearly defines natural resource property rights.94 In litiga-
tion contexts, support for a variety of positions will inevitably be
found. Legislative history analysis is equally uncertain. The re-
cord of a bill's creation rarely provides unambiguous support for
a specific legal interpretation. 9 As a result, preemption obscures
the question of public interests in natural resources.
B. Conceptual Challenges to Traditional Public Natural
Resource Rights Theories
Novel, direct challenges to traditional public-ownership con-
cepts present a second source of uncertainty regarding natural
resource rights. Defendants in high-stakes environmental litiga-
tion increasingly attack basic common law concepts in an effort
to undermine the legal support for environmental claims.
For example, it is plausible that the CWA and CERCLA imply public ownership of
natural resources, because both statutes provide for damages, which are traditionally paid
to owners. But it is also conceivable that a statute could create a damage remedy without
also implying a right; damages remedies might be simply punitive, like criminal sanc-
tions.
9' To illustrate, in a discussion of the non-compliance penalty of § 105 of the CAA, the
final joint report states:
[Tihe polluter, after all, is using a public resource (air or water) for free. This use
amounts to a subsidy by those (the public) who would otherwise be able to use it in
an unpolluted state and must now either clean it up themselves, suffer its pollution,
or abstain from using it. To shift the responsibility back to the polluter is to remove
the hidden subsidy.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, HR Rep No 95-294, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 73 (1977), re-
printed in 1977 USCCAN 1077, 1151. This language appears to imply a public property
right in the atmosphere.
At the same time, however, the CAA expressly did not authorize damage remedies,
which had been included in the earlier CWA and CERCLA. See Currie, Air Pollution §
8.13 (cited in note 64). In the event of preemption, the lack of damage remedies could be
taken as a reformation of basic property rights; although the public might be entitled to
some compensation for the use of atmospheric resources by polluters, they would not own
the resource, and thus would not be entitled to the higher valuation produced by WTA.
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For example, consider the disputes over insurance coverage
under CERCLA. Extensive litigation has focused on whether
standard comprehensive general liability ("CGL") clauses in in-
surance agreements apply to cleanup and response costs mandat-
ed by CERCLA 6 A typical CGL policy provides coverage for the
legal obligations of an insured when paid as "damages" for injury
to "property."7 While the major issue in CGL coverage cases has
been whether response costs are "damages" within the meaning
of the policy, insurers also have challenged whether pollution of
natural resources can amount to "property" damage. 8 Insurers
have contended, for example, that government actions under
CERCLA cannot be construed as suits for property damages
because the notion of public ownership of natural resources is
only a nineteenth-century "fiction."99 Whatever the public's in-
terests might be, insurers argue, they do not comprise the same
sorts of rights that accrue to private, fee-simple landowners."°
Currently, state and federal precedents tend to cut against
the insurers' position. Challenges to the basic notion of public
ownership rights have generally failed.'' But the volume and
sophistication of such arguments are likely to grow as the rela-
tionship between property rights and the size of damage awards
or cleanup valuations becomes increasingly obvious. Should new
litigation over public property rights emerge, the possibility that
conflicting decisions will appear in different state or federal juris-
dictions will increase. This outcome would, at the very least,
further obscure the legal doctrines defining public interests in
natural resources.
For an excellent summary of the CGL issue in CERCLA litigation, see Kenneth S.
Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 27 Valp U L Rev 601
(1993). See also Note, CERCLA Cleanup Costs Under Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Policies: Property Damage or Economic Damage?, 56 Fordham L Rev 1169
(1988); AIU Insurance Co. v Superior Court, 51 Cal 3d 807, 799 P2d 1253 (1990); Aerojet-
General Corp. v Superior Court, 211 Cal App 3d 216 (1989), abrogated, 51 Cal 3d 807
(1990).
9, See, for example, AIU Insurance, 51 Cal 3d at 824-43.
9 See id at 842-43; Aerojet, 211 Cal App 3d at 229-30.
Aerojet, 211 Cal App 3d at 229.
'" Id.
01 For a summary of the outcomes of challenges to the notion of public ownership
rights, see AIU Insurance, 51 Cal 3d at 839. For a review of decisions rejecting the argu-
ment that traditional common-law concepts of government ownership of natural resources
are meaningless abstractions, see Aerojet, 211 Cal App 3d at 229-30 ("Unquestionably, the
state and federal governments are third party property owners for purposes of insurance
coverage. Pollution of the ground and river waters is damage to public property, as well
as a direct injury to public welfare.").
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C. The New Property Rights Approach
CV researchers have themselves added to the uncertainty
regarding public property rights. To justify their exclusive reli-
ance on WTP, a small but influential group of CV practitioners
has suggested a "new property rights approach" in which natural
resources are likened to condominium common areas for which
each user pays a fee."2 Proposed increases or decreases in com-
monly held goods of this sort, it is claimed, are properly con-
ceived in terms of a WTP decision.0 3 For example, under the
new property rights approach, WTP is the appropriate method for
valuing Grand Canyon air quality because:
[T]he residents may possess the right to clean air but [if the
source of pollution is owned by the public] they have to pay
for it through higher electricity prices. Thus, the effective
property right is WTP not WTA.' °4
So stated, the new property rights approach is unconvincing.
The problem is that any statement in favor of WTP treatment
can also be restated to support a WTA position. Since parallel
rhetoric can be used to describe identical facts and yet produce
opposite conclusions, the new property rights approach appears
to be more an exercise in rhetoric than a principled analysis. The
Grand Canyon visibility issue, for example, could be reformulated
to fit a WTA perspective as follows:
The residents may have dirtier air than they have a right to
but they are compensated for the dirtier air through lower
electricity prices. Thus, they are effectively accepting money
in compensation for dirtier air, making the effective property
right WTA not WTP.I 5
102 An extensive discussion of the "new property rights approach" is found in Mitchell
and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods at 38-41 (cited in note 5). The basic
concept they propose is that for non-excludable public goods like air and water, consumers
must either pay to maintain quality levels or, if they fail to make such payments, suffer
decreases in the quality of the common amenities they enjoy. Id at 38-39.
"03 In Mitchell and Carson's analysis, WTP applies when a given level of public good
quality is not currently available and the public wishes to obtain the higher quality. Id at
40. WTP is also applicable, they argue, when there is a proposed decrease in public good
quality, since the consumers are already paying for the good on a regular basis. Id at 41.
A potential reduction in the good's quality is therefore best valued by asking consumers
what they would be willing to pay to forego the reduction in the quality of the good and
still be as well off as before. Id.
104 See Carson, Constructed Markets at 130 (cited in note 8).
105 See RAND Report at 19 (cited in note 24).
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Consequently, the new property rights approach cannot settle the
issue of whether WTP or WTA is the appropriate measure. It is
simply an illogical attempt to reassign property rights in a fash-
ion that would ease the difficult task of CV practitioners. The
valid assignment of property rights remains a matter of law.
Still, the recent (and currently inadequate) attempts by some
CV practitioners to justify their use of WTP surveys in settings
where WTA would be appropriate could ultimately generate more
sophisticated arguments that depart from traditional public-own-
ership concepts. As law-and-economics specialists begin to ad-
dress issues of natural resource property rights, the complexity of
the underlying legal analysis will almost certainly increase. In
turn, the practical determination of the applicable rights may
become more difficult.
D. Federal Land-Use Doctrines
Finally, the unsettled nature of federal land-use policies also
complicates the definition of natural resource rights. The idea
that WTA is the sole conceptually appropriate form of CV if the
public "owns" national amenities far too simply equates propri-
etary interests with the legally significant rights required to
perform valuations. Even in private contexts, landowners cede
important property rights to others. In most communities, for
example, utility companies possess easements to enter homesites
for maintenance and safety reasons. Similarly, private parties
may well enjoy certain commercial rights in public lands. If their
reasonable exercise of such rights generates environmental harm,
WTP questions may be appropriate to value damages or restora-
tion costs. In effect, to prevent reasonable damage to public
lands, the public must compensate rights holders for the loss of
their commercial opportunities.
Federal land-management policies reflect a constant effort to
balance public and private interests in natural resources. This
balance can be struck in a number of ways. National parks most
reflect the concept that federal lands are held in trust for the
public; the parks are generally administered to preserve resourc-
es in a natural state for public enjoyment. °" At the other ex-
treme are public lands dedicated almost entirely to commercial
1"6 George C. Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning
of "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield" for Public Land Management, 53 U Colo L Rev 229, 235
(1982). For an analysis of the land-use principles that originally distinguished the various
forms of federal land management programs, see id at 232-43.
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uses, such as those managed for domestic livestock grazing by
the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM").'0 In between, na-
tional forests are managed according to a "multiple use, sus-
tained yield" principle under which extensive oil, mineral, and
timber harvesting, as well as ranching and recreation, are per-
mitted.0
8
The extensive, multi-faceted use of federal lands allows pri-
vate interests to claim that they enjoy certain exploitation rights
which the public may not curtail without providing compensa-
tion. Even in the national parks, for example, mining was still
permitted in six cases as of 1982, and ranchers still retain graz-
ing rights in at least one park. l0 ' The likelihood of a construc-
tive "pollution easement" arising from public-land exploitation is
considerably greater on national forest or BLM property, where
enormous timber, oil, mineral, and livestock projects are com-
monplace."0 In many cases, economic activity on public land is
107 Id at 237.
'08 Id at 235, 251-57.
109 In the mid-1970s, continued mining activity in certain national parks was viewed
as a threat to the integrity of unique national resources. In response, Congress enacted
the Mining in the Parks Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-429, 90 Stat 1342 (1976), codified at 16
USC §§ 1901-1912 (1988 & Supp IV 1992), which created a mandatory recording system
to preclude mining claims in national parks. 16 USC § 1907. Nevertheless, six years later,
mining still continued under valid claims in Crater Lake National Park, Coronado Nation-
al Memorial, Death Valley National Monument, Glacier Bay National Monument, Mount
McKinley National Park, and Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. For an analysis of
the recording provision and its effects, see generally Eva Novak, Mining and the National
Park System, 2 J Energy L & Pol 165, 171-78 (1982). In addition, to secure the requisite
land to create the Great Basin National Park, located on the extreme eastern border of
Nevada and Utah, ranchers with prior rights to graze on federal land were granted
continuing access to national park forage, a situation unique in the national park system.
10 George Coggins describes the significance of commercial exploitation of federal
lands as follows:
The most striking statistic is that about half the Nation's commercial softwood
sawtimber inventory is in the national forests alone ....
Timber and oil are prominent in the national resource picture, but the public
lands contain many other scarce resources. Most remaining American big game ani-
mals, including some that are endangered, are found on federal land. And some, such
as timber wolves, are found only there. Some fourteen percent of all cattle and sheep
raised in the United States spend a part of their lives fattening on federal forage.
The mineral wealth removed from lands now and formally federal is beyond calcula-
tion. As much as two-thirds of the total water yield in the eleven Western States
originates in the federal reservations at higher elevations .... The recreational op-
portunities amenities offered by the hundreds of miles of whitewater, the ocean
beaches, the scenic vistas and the reservoirs under federal control are beyond dollar
valuation.
... Public land management is big business. The resource allocation decisions that
are made concerning these federal lands can have life-or-death consequences for
various operations that depend upon public land use, including cattle ranches, saw-
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also regulated by specialized statutes, such as the 1955 Surface
Resources Act' or the Multiple Mineral Development Act,"'
which may create additional pivate rights in public lands."'
Indeed, private ranchers have in fact secured judicial recognition,
based on "statutory preference and agency deference," for their
rights to forage on BLM land."4
The concept that multiple uses may require at least some
permissible natural resource degradation, and that the public
should have to pay to protect national amenities from such harm,
could also extend to developments outside of federal lands. For
example, many perceive a need to manage whole ecosystems,
rather than simply the more limited lands contained in formal
park or forest boundaries."5 But efforts to force administrative
agencies to address ecosystem management issues, even when
treasured national park integrity is at issue, have been generally
unsuccessful to date."6
This precedent could support claims that an implicit tradeoff
between essential economic activities and public rights in natural
resources is an inherent part of American law. Alternatively, it
might be argued that by failing to restrain environmental en-
croachments on public lands, the government has in effect waived
mills, tourist facilities, hunting outfitters, and the like.
Coggins, 53 U Colo L Rev at 233-34 (cited in note 106). For a review of the basic princi-
ples of multiple-use management and case studies, see id at 240-50.
.1. Pub L No 84-167, 69 Stat 368 (1955), codified at 30 USC §§ 611-12 (1988).
.12 Pub L No 83-585, 68 Stat 709 (1954), codified as amended at 30 USC §§ 521-31
(1988).
1 See Coggins, 53 U Colo L Rev at 278.
11 See id at 236. There are no corresponding "rights" to national forest resources. Id.
115 An ecosystem is often defined as "a unit made up of all the living and nonliving
units of a particular area that interact and exchange materials with each other." Robert
B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and Ecology in the
Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U Colo L Rev 923, 929 (1989), citing The Facts on File
Dictionary of Biology 97 (1988). For a summary of the concept of the ecosystem and its
application to public land management policy, see 60 Colo L Rev at 929-43.
" See generally id at 944-51; Comment, Protecting National Parks from Developments
Beyond Their Borders, 132 U Pa L Rev 1189, 1189-1201 (1985). The Comment also dis-
cusses the issue of ecosystem management in the context of federal common-law pre-
emption. Id at 1191-97. It argues that while the Supreme Court's preemption decisions
have largely eroded the federal common law of nuisance used to redress extraterritorial
harms to national parks or forests, "a more general body of federal common law of nui-
sance may remain intact," serving as a deterrent to those planning environmentally
harmful activities on lands adjacent to parks and forests. Id at 1195. See also A. Dan
Tarlock, Local Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U Chi L Rev 555, 603-605
(1993) (suggesting that local governments may supplement federally imposed standards
conserving wildlife and other environmental resources).
19941
The University of Chicago Law Review
its right to enforce the environmental laws." 7 If so, WTP would
be proper for natural resource valuation studies.
In summary, natural resource rights analysis is complicated
by several doctrinal, theoretical, and strategic litigation concerns.
In practice, because defining public interests in national ameni-
ties will increasingly be required to effectuate federal environ-
mental protection programs, rights issues threaten to overwhelm
environmental law. As the near decade-long struggle over the
DOI valuation regulations illustrates, environmental disputes
encourage no-holds-barred litigation. If natural resource rights
analysis is left to the judicial process, significant delays and costs
may preclude effective environmental protection.
Legislative intervention may be necessary to avoid this out-
come. Rather than endure years of contention over the effects of
preemption on federal common law, or rely on the implications of
the language of the CWA, the CAA, or CERCLA to define prop-
erty rights, Congress could simply pass legislation defining the
applicable property rights for natural resource valuation. If it is
desirable to affirm the public ownership concepts embedded in
federal common law, Congress should require that estimates of
damages reflect the public's property rights. In many cases this
would imply that WTA questions would be the conceptually ap-
propriate method for making valuations. Alternatively, Congress
could declare that these natural resources should not be consid-
ered to be owned by the public, making WTP questions the con-
ceptually correct form in most natural resource damage disputes.
In either case, a definitive determination of natural resource
property rights would avoid the lengthy litigation that would
otherwise almost certainly result.
CONCLUSION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LESS-SUBSTITUTABLE
GOODS
We have argued that the valuation of goods having no close
substitutes, including many disputed natural resources, can be
highly sensitive to the definition of property rights. A growing
... Environmental law contains concepts that could support a litigant's effort to raise
a waiver defense. CERCLA actions, for example, can be defended on the grounds that a
discharge took place as permitted under several environmental, chemical, regulatory, or
other federal statutes. 42 USC § 9607(j). See also Andrew J. Simons and James H. Wicks,
Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: Here They Come, Ready or Not, 63 St John's
L Rev 801, 816-17 (1989). If the exercise of private statutory rights in public lands pre-
dictably causes some environmental harm, a waiver defense may arise.
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number of disputes involve public environmental goods that are
not valued through standard market mechanisms or other ob-
servable behaviors of the public; CV techniques or other similar
surveys are the only viable methods for valuing these goods.
Further, unlike situations involving highly substitutable goods, it
is not possible to measure properly the value of the good until
the property rights to it have been established. Defining such
rights, however, is complicated by preemption of prior legal doc-
trines and increasingly sophisticated challenges to traditional
concepts of public resource ownership. The law-and-economics
principles applicable to less-substitutable goods have significant
theoretical and practical ramifications for America's environmen-
tal protection efforts.
These principles may also affect American jurisprudence
more generally. First, they may reshape basic theories of value.
As we have discussed, economists have been forced to devise
valuation methodologies that measure more than market values
alone. There seems little justification not to apply the same tech-
niques to other legal disputes. It is reasonable to suppose that
most amenities are valued by their owners along a range defined
by pure commodity goods (which are freely substitutable) at one
extreme and unique natural resources (which are not) at the
other. Just as with unique natural resources, valuing goods locat-
ed in the less-substitutable spectrum should involve measuring
the non-market premium values they possess. To this end, it will
be necessary to build appropriate non-market measurement
methods like CV to reach principled conclusions in non-environ-
mental legal disputes that involve unique goods.
It will also be necessary to reconsider the role of courts in
defining economic rights. Applying the restrictive assumptions
required by conventional analysis, economists have taught adju-
dicators that they need not actually determine the rights of the
parties to value economic damages. Instead, they can look to
market values; application of other measures by government or
the courts would only interfere with a valuation presented by
efficient market mechanisms. But for less-substitutable goods,
market valuation fails, and damages cannot be measured until
property rights are defined. While in some cases deciding such
rights should not be difficult, in others the complexity that cur-
rently afflicts natural resource rights analysis may recur."'
l18 For example, torts involving intellectual property could well require extremely
complex derivations of applicable rights. In addition to damages from the loss of potential
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In environmental law, the need to define property rights in
legal disputes may necessitate a political solution. Ultimately,
the role of legal and political decisionmakers in American law
would likely be quite different than conventional legal and econ-
omic studies assume. Consequently, disputes involving less-sub-
stitutable goods could stimulate a widespread reconsideration of
the relation between property rights and economic allocation.
Many may resist this process, preferring the methodological puri-
ty and comparative simplicity offered by conventional analysis.
These traits are certainly attractive. But should environmental
law precedents be extended to other cases, as is likely, the
change may be inevitable. The theoretical and practical problems
now surrounding CV natural resource studies might therefore
presage future challenges of deriving the law and economics of all
less-substitutable goods.
market or "use value" of an intellectual good, it is likely that the "owners" of ideas derive
substantial non-use/non-market utility from their rights to exploit the concepts they de-
velop. Measuring harm to such goods also involves non-use values. But in order to value
non-use utilities associated with intellectual property, it is first necessary to precisely
identify the character of ownership rights of such goods.
Defining rights to intellectual property, however, has often confounded commenta-
tors and courts. Similar problems may develop in other instances in which measuring the
non-use values of less substitutable goods is necessary to resolve legal disputes.
